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INTRODUCTION
Common Issues of Professional Responsibility
THOMAS EHRLICH*
The thesis of these brief comments can be stated simply: Many difficult
questions involving the professional responsibilities of lawyers are also troub-
lesome problems for professionals in other fields. Questions concerning con-
fidentiality, conflicts of interest, and informed consent are examples of
common concerns. My conclusion is also easy to express, though not to
achieve: Commentaries on legal ethics in the pages of this new journal and
elsewhere should draw on insights from other professions.
Unfortunately, most problems in legal ethics have been analyzed as though
the issues were unique to the legal profession.1 This approach seems particu-
larly paradoxical given the central role lawyers play in serving non-legal pro-
fessionals. In all events, the consideration of ethical dilemmas facing
attorneys-and how best to resolve those dilemmas-can be enriched sub-
stantially by comparisons with other professions. Similarly, lawyers con-
cerned about legal ethics can help those in other professions shape solutions
for their ethical concerns.
* Provost and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1956, LL.B. 1959, Harvard
University. Dean, Stanford Law School, 1971-75; President-elect, Indiana University.
My interests in the comparative dimensions of professional responsibility were significantly en-
hanced in recent years by two experiences. First, I have met periodically with faculty members
from professional schools at the University of Pennsylvania to discuss ethical issues of common
interest. Second, I have taught undergraduate seminars on ethics and professions, drawing on
materials from various professions. My concerns about the professional responsibilities of lawyers
were enhanced by serving on the American Bar Association's Commission on Evaluation of Profes-
sional Standards, the so-called Kutak Commission, which drafted the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules were adopted by the ABA in 1983.
Numerous volumes have been written on ethical issues within other professions. Examples in-
clude: ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN ENGINEERING (R. BAUM & A. FLORES eds. 1978); T. BEAUCHAMP
" J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1983); C. CHRISTIANS, K. ROTZOLL,
& M. FACKLER, MEDIA ETHICS (1983); F. LOEWENBERG & R. DOLGOFF, ETHICAL DECISIONS
FOR SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE (2nd ed. 1985); P. REYNOLDS, ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN SOCIAL SCI-
ENCE RESEARCH (1979); J. THOMPSON & H. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN NURSING (1981). M. BAYLES,
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1981) is one of the rare studies that draws on ethical issues in several
professions.
1. G. HAZARD & D. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION
(1985) is one of the few books of teaching materials on legal ethics to provide a context of profes-
sional responsibility that extends beyond lawyering.
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I. THE COMPARATIVE SCENE IN PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
In recent decades, several surveys on various aspects of comparative pro-
fessional ethics have been published. The most significant, a 1980 study by
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, reviews profes-
sional ethics activities in the Association's affiliated scientific and technical
societies.2 The study covers 146 professional societies-ranging in size from
193,000 to 170 members-such as the American Psychiatric Association, the
National Association of Social Workers, and the National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers. (Because bar groups are not members of the Association,
the legal profession was not part of the study.) Although published more
than a half decade ago, the study remains a valuable source (or at least start-
ing point) on many issues covered by codes of professional ethics. It lists
forty-one professional societies with formalized ethical rules. Many of these
organizations are involved in activities far removed from lawyering, and cau-
tion is obviously important in drawing analogies. The study indicates, how-
ever, that numerous issues covered by the codes of other professions bear
directly on legal ethics. These include: competency as a prerequisite for un-
dertaking a professional assignment; reporting to authorities other profes-
sionals engaged in unethical practices; accepting and rejecting clients;
limitations on advertising; and fee splitting.
Definitions of what constitutes a "profession" abound, not all of them flat-
tering. Many focus particularly on a need for specialized academic training
and a degree of self-regulation. For present purposes, an exclusive definition
is not necessary. It is helpful, however, to limit this discussion to profession-
als who serve clients, because most questions about the professional responsi-
bilities of lawyers involve serving clients. At the same time, this limitation
admittedly excludes a number of occupations with ethical problems analo-
gous to those in lawyering.
Journalists, for example, are excluded by this limitation because they gen-
erally do not serve clients, at least not in the same ways as doctors and archi-
tects. Yet journalists must frequently decide which confidences to maintain
2. R. CHALK, M. FRANKEL, & S. CHAFER, AAAS PROFESSIONAL ETHICS PROJECT: PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS AcTIVITIES IN THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING SOCIETIES (1980). This report
summarizes a number of prior surveys, id. at 10-16, and includes an annotated bibliography, id. at
216-24.
Several organizations are particularly concerned with studying issues of professional ethics. Two
of the most significant are the Hastings Center in Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, and the Center
for the Study of Ethics in the Professions at the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago, Illinois.
A number of other organizations focus attention either on ethical issues involving a single cluster of
professions-such as the National Project on Philosophy and Engineering Ethics at Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York-or on policy issues that include aspects of professional
ethics-such as the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland, College
Park, Maryland.
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and which to reveal, a common ethical dilemma facing lawyers. Further, the
constraints that journalists face in these situations are comparable to those
facing lawyers in several respects. For example, the information in question
would not have been revealed except in confidence; if the confidence is bro-
ken, others may refuse to reveal confidences to the detriment of the journal-
ist's or lawyer's ability to practice his or her profession.
The matter is complicated further because no sharp lines separate profes-
sions whose members serve clients from other professions. One may urge,
for example, that journalists do serve clients-the public. These comments,
however, pertain only to professions primarily structured to provide services
or products to clients. Nursing, social work, business, and engineering are all
included, even though the relations of professionals to clients are obviously
different in business and engineering than in law or medicine. In fact, these
relations are not precisely the same in any two professions. Rather, while it
is a benefit of comparative analysis to link the various factors involved in
considering a common ethical dilemma, the actual practices of the profes-
sions under review differ significantly. These differences often can provide
useful perspectives on common issues.
Whatever the definition of a "profession," it is appropriate to ask whether
any particular profession has special responsibilities to the public. Some defi-
nitions, in fact, differentiate professions from other occupations on the
ground of purported special public responsibilities.
For lawyers, one of the most volatile issues in professional ethics is
whether and to what extent, lawyers have a responsibility to provide their
time and talents pro bono publico for the otherwise unrepresented. A dec-
ade-and-a-half ago, F. Raymond Marks analogized the legal profession to a
public utility.3 The profession has a monopoly grant of power, he argued,
and with that monopoly comes the obligation to provide representation on a
pro bono basis. Both as a law school dean and as president of the Legal
Services Corporation, I urged the same position, though on a somewhat dif-
ferent basis.4 In my own view, lawyers are part of the public system of jus-
tice in a different way than the professionals of other disciplines are part of
the contexts in which they work. In contrast, however, it can be argued that
doctors too should provide some of their time and talent pro bono because
medical education is so heavily subsidized by public funds, because health is
a uniquely vital service, and no doubt for other reasons.
Lawyers have devoted more time and careful thought to pro bono service
than professionals in other fields; and, as a profession, lawyers have also fo-
cused more attention on articulating their standards of professional responsi-
3. F. MARKS, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1972).
4. See, e.g., Ehrlich, Lawyers and their Public Responsibilities, 46 TENN. L. REv. 713, 725 (1979);
RATIONING JUSTICE 25-27 (Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, 1979).
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bility than have those in other professions. Both the American Bar
Association's 1969 Model Code and the 1983 Model Rules provide far more
elaborate analyses of issues in professional responsibility than similar codes
and rules in other professions.5 It is hardly surprising that lawyers have gone
further than other professionals in codifying their standards of professional
responsibility, because lawyers formalize standards as a part of their busi-
ness. This reality simply underscores the value to other professions of com-
parative analyses involving the legal profession. 6
The common ethical dilemmas facing professionals who serve clients can
be characterized in various ways. Two underlying clusters of issues are fun-
damental: First, who is in charge-the client or the professional? Second,
who is the client? This introduction will explore each of these clusters, rais-
ing more questions than answers. The point is not to resolve particular issues
of professional responsibility, but to underscore the importance of compara-
tive analysis. Finally, these comments touch briefly on some of the most
troublesome issues facing all professions: maintaining and revealing client
confidences, and candor by a professional to a client and on behalf of a client.
II. WHO IS IN CHARGE: CLIENT OR PROFESSIONAL?
Many of the most troubling ethical issues in every profession serving cli-
ents involve the basic question: Who is or should be making which deci-
sions-client or professional? In the realm of legal ethics, for example, the
rule is well established that any offer to settle a dispute must be communi-
cated by a lawyer to his or her client and the client decides whether to accept
or refuse the offer. 7 Tactical decisions are properly made by the lawyer, but
5. The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (hereinafter MODEL CODE), adopted in
1969, and periodically revised thereafter, and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
adopted in 1983 (hereinafter MODEL RULES), are printed in numerous publications such as SE-
LECTED STATUTES, RULES AND STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION (West Rev. Ed. 1984).
6. The risks and dangers of codifying ethical standards have been underscored in various publica-
tions. Examples include Ladd, The Quest for a Code of Professional Ethics: An Intellectual and
Moral Confusion, in R. CHALK, M. FRANKEL, & S. CHAFER, supra note 2; and J. LIEBERMAN, THE
TYRANNY OF EXPERTS: How PROFESSIONALS ARE CLOSING THE OPEN SOCIETY (1980). Concern
that codes of professional responsibility can be shields to protect members of professions-as op-
posed to the public-is among the most frequent criticism. As applied to the legal profession, see
Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689
(1981).
7. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(a) provides in relevant part:
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation,
subject to paragraphs... (d) and (e), and shall consult with the client as to the means by
which they are pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an
offer of settlement of a matter ....
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences
[Vol. 1:3
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because issues of tactics and substance often overlap, the lawyer's obligation
is often unclear.
Some of the difficult testing cases involve public interest firms, where in a
real sense the client is a social cause such as environmental protection. Such
firms may not ethically condition representation on an agreement not to set-
tle a case even though settlement may undermine completely the very pur-
pose for which the representation was undertaken, often without fee. A
public interest firm may challenge a landlord's allegedly discriminatory
rental practices, for example, and successfully represent a potential renter
rejected by the landlord. The representation may succeed both at trial and
several levels of appeal. At any time, however, the client may choose to ac-
cept a landlord's settlement offer. Unless the public interest firm has brought
a class action, the suit's potential for eliminating the discrimination will be
lost. Although this ethical norm is settled, many difficult questions remain in
other areas of public interest practice. 8
The same general question-who is or should be in charge-faces profes-
sionals in other fields as well. There are few matters of importance for any
professional about which one can imagine concluding that a client need never
be consulted. But the tension between the professional's judgment of what
should be done and deference to the client's wishes is a shared dilemma.
Extreme cases are usually relatively easy. A dentist will not follow a proce-
dure he or she thinks involves unnecessary risks to the patient, even though
the patient may be adamant. Dentistry, incidentally, presents particularly
interesting parallels and contrasts to law because a high share of dental pro-
cedures are elective.9 Most situations, of course, are not so extreme, and, as
a result, are much more difficult.
A professional has to decide not only whether an issue should be presented
to a client for decision, but also, and no less important, what level of knowl-
edge is required for the client's decision to be adequately informed. The pro-
fessional's power to frame an issue is critical. A veterinarian, for example,
may face the question whether to perform euthanasia on an injured pet.
What is the likelihood of recovery by the pet? What are the risks of contin-
ued suffering? What costs will be involved? These and an almost infinite
of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to
make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
law.
(e) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding
the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct.
8. See, e.g., Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegre-
gation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). This article examines the special attorney-client relation
that has evolved from the school desegregation litigation.
9. See Segal & Warner, Informed Consent in Dentistry, 77 J. AM. DENTAL A. 957 (1979).
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variety of other issues can shape, and sometimes force, one decision or an-
other by a client even when it is clear that the owner should decide the issue.
Every profession faces the additional problem of giving content to the con-
cept of a client's informed consent. What information must the client have?
A professional cannot train a client to the professional's level of expertise,
but how much less is appropriate? To what extent is it sufficient for a profes-
sional to express only conclusions and to what extent must the professional
try to inform the client of the relevant factors involved in the decision? Gen-
erally, the professional and the client should interact in the decision making
process, but difficult questions arise about how best to promote that
interaction.
In some situations it is advisable, if not essential, to obtain a client's waiver
of consent. Among the most familiar are the consent forms used by hospitals
and doctors. Doctors are increasing their efforts to limit liability in the realm
of possible medical malpractice. Mandatory arbitration by a stipulated
method represents one procedural approach,10 with obvious and interesting
analogies for potential legal malpractice.
Perhaps the most obvious cluster of dilemmas in the realm of "Who is in
charge?" involves conflicts between the personal values or interests of indi-
vidual professionals and the values or interests of their clients. Conflicts be-
tween the economic interests of professionals and clients are usually the
easiest to resolve-which is not to say they are always easy. An attorney,
naturally, should not represent a client when that attorney has an economic
interest adverse to the client either because of the attorney's own economic
activities or because the attorney represents another client with conflicting
interests. Many of these same conflict of interest issues arise in other profes-
sions. When a stockbroker recommends the purchase of bonds in which the
broker's firm has taken a financial position, for example, should the broker be
required to reveal that position? What if the broker's commission varies de-
pending on which bond issue a client purchases? Is disclosure of that infor-
mation to the client ethically required?
Even more common than conflicts of interest in other professions are con-
flicts of values. In lawyering, these conflicts involve how an attorney should
decide whether to represent a client with whose values the attorney disagrees.
Obviously, a key question is whether the representation furthers those values.
As in other areas, the extreme situations seem easy. It is plainly unethical for
a lawyer to represent a client in promoting an illegal enterprise, except in
limited circumstances such as testing the constitutionality of a law's prohibi-
tion. Similarly, a doctor should not, as a matter of medical ethics, provide a
10. See Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal Obsta-
cles, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (1986).
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drug that is not approved by the Food and Drug Administration. The fact
that the lawyer personally believes the enterprise should be legal or that the
doctor personally believes that the drug should be approved are not grounds
for concluding otherwise. Even these extreme situations become much more
difficult when the facts are changed only slightly, especially when the profes-
sional cannot resort to legal proscriptions.
If a lawyer believes abortion is unethical, should he or she represent a
clinic seeking a license to perform legal abortions? Should a doctor with per-
sonal beliefs similar to the lawyer perform abortions? The analogy is not
exact, but the distinctions can help to clarify the issues. For instance, the
doctor's responsibility to determine whether a mother's life is at stake has no
obvious counterpart in the lawyer's decision. Similarly, there is no precise
medical analogy to whether a lawyer should represent a tobacco company or
other client if the lawyer disapproves of the product or thinks that the cli-
ent's goal may ill serve the public interest. Sharp differences on the issues
have been expressed by lawyers."1 My point, as indicated, is not to resolve
these issues, but to underscore their similarities.
The discussion thus far implicitly assumes that a single professional is
working for a single client. Often, however, a number of professionals are
involved. They may be members of the same or different professions. This is
perhaps most frequently true in the medical arena. The American Nurses'
Association Code For Nurses, for example, states that "the nurse assumes re-
sponsibility and accountability for individual nursing judgments and ac-
tions." 2 In a particular case a nurse may conclude that her professional
responsibility requires telling a patient that the patient is dying, though a
doctor treating that patient disagrees. Most doctors, I suspect, would claim
that their judgments should control because they are in charge of medical
treatment. Many nurses would respond, however, that they are more closely
involved on a day-to-day basis with the patients, better understand the pa-
tients and their emotions, and have an independent set of professional re-
sponsibilities. Similar conflicts occur between lawyers and social workers in
terms of revealing particular information to a client. These issues can be
multiplied, but the broad area of concern should be evident.
Professionals employed by public agencies face a special set of problems.
In these situations, the professional's responsibility is to represent the public.
Who decides what the public's interests are? These issues arise for almost
every type of professional employed by a public agency. In the State Depart-
ment, where I once worked, lawyers in the Legal Adviser's Office tradition-
ally referred to those whom they advise, the Assistant Secretary for African
11. See, e.g., M. GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT 285-89 (1975).
12. AMERICAN NuRSEs' ASSOCIATION CODE FOR NURSES (1986), reprinted in J. THOMPSON &
H. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN NURSING, at 11 (1981).
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
Affairs, for example, as their "clients." The Legal Adviser frequently refers
to the Secretary of State in the same way. Yet one view holds that a govern-
ment lawyer's responsibilities to the public extend beyond those of attorneys
representing private clients. The U.S. Government recently decided, for ex-
ample, not to recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
when Nicaragua brought suit. I have heard informally that lawyers within
the Legal Adviser's office opposed the decision. When President Reagan de-
cided to invade Grenada early in his administration, the Legal Adviser's Of-
fice prepared a brief defending the action under international law. Again,
based on informal reports, I understand that many in the Legal Adviser's
Office believed that action lacked legal justification. Did those lawyers have
a special set of responsibilities to the public because they worked in public
agencies? What steps should they have taken if called on to defend a position
they thought legally erroneous?
The same issues apply to the decisions of doctors in a public health service,
government social workers, and other professionals in public agencies. These
questions lead directly to the second broad cluster of underlying issues de-
serving of comparative analysis.
III. WHO IS THE CLIENT?
Posing the initial cluster of issues as "Who is in charge?" assumes the
client can be identified. In ethical dilemmas involving professionals in many
fields, however, "Who is the client?" is itself a difficult problem. For exam-
ple, social workers are frequently employed by public agencies to help resolve
difficult problems between parents and children. 13 Do social workers owe a
primary duty to parents or children, or equal duties to both? Or is their duty
to the organizations that employ them? For the increasing numbers of pro-
fessionals who work for organizations, simply identifying the client is a
troublesome task.
The Kutak Commission grappled with the problems of lawyers in repre-
senting organizational clients and took several steps beyond the prior code,
which was totally silent on the matter. 14 Yet many issues regarding the ethi-
13. See generally R. DOLGOFF & F. LOEWENBERG, ETHICAL DECISIONS FOR SOCIAL WORK
PRACTICE (2d ed. 1985).
14. MODEL RULES Rule 1.13 (Organization as Client). This rule provides much less scope for
"whistleblowing" than was permitted in earlier versions drafted by the Kutak Commission. Rule
1.13 provides in relevant part:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associ-
ated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter
related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or
a violation which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and is likely to result
[Vol. 1:3
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cal responsibilities of organization attorneys remain. The manner in which
engineers and business people employed by corporations should handle simi-
lar problems can shed light on what is appropriate conduct by lawyers.
15
Another and quite different aspect of the issue-who is the client?-in-
volves situations in which a professional is hired by someone other than the
individual to be represented. This is, of course, the norm when that individ-
ual is a minor. Obvious questions arise when the minor and the parents disa-
gree about what course to follow. These conflicts can occur within the scope
of any professional's services. No profession has developed a satisfactory set
of answers for all these issues, but little comparative analysis has been done.
This cluster of questions also relates closely to the problems involved when
a client lacks some degree of competency. How to define competency and
who defines it are issues common to all professions. To a degree, the issue of
competency is involved in every client representation by every professional; a
client seeks help from a professional because the client is, or at least feels,
inadequate if not incompetent to handle the issues in question. When a client
is mentally retarded, providing appropriate representation becomes more
challenging. In such situations, a guardian is often the answer to "Who is
the client?" That answer is frequently not feasible because of the costs in-
volved. This problem is a prime example of an area in which lawyers have
no monopoly on the dilemmas involved and can gain from comparative
analyses.
in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably neces-
sary in the best interest of the organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer
shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the
scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the organization and
the apparent motives involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters
and any other relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize
disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the repre-
sentation to persons outside the organization. Such measures may include among others:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to
appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted
by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in behalf
of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) If, despite the lawyer's effort in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest authority
that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is
clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization,
the lawyer may resign in accordance with rule 1.16.
G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978) is the most thoughtful analysis of the
ethical issues facing corporate counsel.
15. See, e.g., M. CURD & L. MAY, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HARMFUL ACTIONS
(Module Series in Applied Ethics, Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, 1984).
1987]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
IV. CONFIDENCES AND CANDOR: THE MOST TROUBLESOME ISSUES
Three clusters of issues in the realm of legal ethics have been debated with
particular passion in recent years: First, under what circumstances may or
must a professional reveal the confidences of a client? Second, when if ever is
less than full candor by a professional justified on behalf of a client? Third,
when if ever is less than full candor by a professional justified to a client?
Because these three issues arise in the context of every profession that serves
clients, they are particularly useful bases for comparison.
The basic arguments that it is unethical for a lawyer to reveal the confi-
dences of a client are well known. Most important, it is claimed, a lawyer
can best represent a client only if the lawyer understands all that actually
happened. If the client fears the lawyer may reveal what the client says, the
client will shape his or her statements accordingly, and the result will be
inadequate representation and, viewed more generally, inadequate service in
the cause of justice.
All would agree that a few exceptions must exist, but when the Kutak
Commission tried to establish a rule authorizing lawyers to reveal confi-
dences in an expanded range of situations, the American Bar Association
reacted by cutting back the permissible occasions even further than in the
prior code. 16 In my view, the Kutak Commission should have required, or at
least authorized, lawyers to reveal confidences in a broader range of situa-
tions than it did propose. Obviously, I think the American Bar Association,
by rejecting even the Commission's view, was in error. My point here, again,
is not to debate these issues, but to urge comparison of the lawyer's situation
to that of other professionals.
The basic arguments are essentially the same for a number of other profes-
sions, particularly medicine and social work. Unless a patient feels comforta-
ble in telling a doctor the full facts, the doctor cannot adequately treat that
patient. Yet there may be strong reasons for a doctor to reveal a patient's
confidences. This is most obviously true when a communicable disease is
16. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 provides:
Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the
client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allega-
tions in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
[Vol. 1: 3
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involved and the health of others-as well as the patient-is at stake. Several
courts have upheld requirements for particular professions similar to the
standards in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.17 Other judicial
decisions, however, have adopted approaches for some professions that differ
from those standards. 18
The Model Rules state that, "In the course of representing a client a law-
yer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact to a third
person ... ."19 The arena where that blanket requirement would seem most
troublesome-negotiations-is excluded as a matter of definition in the com-
ments to the Model Rules. The codes of other professions that I have re-
viewed do not focus on the issue as directly as the Model Rules. The problem
arises, however, in many situations. A doctor knows that a patient has Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), but the patient does not want
his or her family to know. When the family asks the doctor for the facts,
should the doctor lie? Business persons obviously face this problem not only
in negotiations, but in many other circumstances as well. A full comparative
analysis of the situations would be extremely useful both for lawyering and
other professions.
Last, it is helpful to consider whether there are counterparts to the situa-
tion in which it is appropriate for a doctor to prescribe a placebo to a patient
-in other words, to lie to that patient. When a lawyer thinks a client will be
a more effective witness if the client does not know a particular fact, is it
justifiable to withhold knowledge of that fact? Similarly, some psychological
testing is feasible only if the subjects of the test are not told key facts about
the testing. Are there analogies in legal ethics?
I underscore in conclusion that the common issues of professional respon-
sibility raised in these comments are illustrative and not exhaustive, and not
all of the issues fit within the categories "Who is in charge?" and "Who is the
client?" One substantial cluster of other questions, for example, relates to
how and by whom allocations of limited benefits are made among clients.
17. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (psychologist did not reveal that patient had threatened to kill plaintiff's
child). The California Supreme Court, in upholding the plaintiff's claim that a psychologist had a
duty to reveal a patient's confidential communication, relied in part on section 9 of the Principles of
Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association: "A physician may not reveal the confidence
entrusted to him in the course of medical attendane ... unless he is required to do so by law or
unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community."
18. See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Young Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984) (accountants' confidential
tax workpapers not protected from disclosure); Saverman v. Saverman, 170 Colo. 368, 461 P.2d 18
(1969) ("public interest" is basis for determining whether probation officer appointed by court is
subject to cross-examination regarding confidential communications).
19. MODEL RULES Rule 4.1.
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The problems of choice facing legal-services lawyers struggling to serve more
clients than they can handle are related to the difficulties of doctors in decid-
ing which patients should receive special medical treatment when facilities
are limited. Similarly, a wide range of questions involving fees are common
to all professions. What criteria should apply in setting fees? Is the ability to
pay an appropriate consideration? When are contingency fees a profession-
ally responsible means to share risks?
In short, there is ample room and substantial need for systematic reviews
of issues involving professional ethics, profession by profession, particularly
in terms of those professions that involve representing clients. I hope that
the pages of this new journal will be marked by insights from those reviews.
